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Abstract 
In a series of recent papers, Mark Roe and Lucian Bebchuk have developed further the 
concept of path dependence, combined it with concepts of evolution and used it to 
challenge the wide-spread view that the corporate governance systems of the major 
advanced economies are likely to converge towards the economically best system at a 
rapid pace. The present paper shares this skepticism, but adds several aspects which 
strengthen the point made by Roe and Bebchuk.  
The present paper argues that it is important for the topic under discussion to 
distinguish clearly between two arguments which can explain path dependence. One of 
them is based on the role of adjustment costs, and the other one uses concepts borrowed 
from evolutionary biology. Making this distinction is important because the two 
concepts of path dependence have different implications for the issue of rapid 
convergence to the best system.  
In addition, we introduce a formal concept of complementarity and demonstrate that 
national corporate governance systems are usefully regarded as – possibly consistent – 
systems of complementary elements. Complementarity is a reason for path dependence 
which supports the socio-biological  argument. The dynamic properties of systems 
composed of complementary elements  are such that a rapid convergence towards a 
universally best corporate governance systems is not likely to happen.  
We then proceed by showing for the case of corporate governance systems shaped by 
complementarity, that there even is the possibility of a convergence towards a common 
system which is economically inferior. And in the specific case of European integration, 
"inefficient convergence" of corporate governance systems is a possible future course 
of events. 
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 I. Introduction  
 
There are essentially three overriding substantive themes which shape the international academic 
debate on national corporate governance systems:    
(1) What constitutes a good, or workable, or efficient, corporate governance system?  
(2) Which of the prototypes of corporate governance systems that we know is economically more 
efficient, or simply better?  
(3) Is there a tendency towards a convergence between the different national corporate governance 
systems, and if so, can this convergence be expected to be rapid and relatively smooth? 
Behind these substantive issues, there is the methodological issue of how one can usefully describe 
and analyze corporate governance systems in general and specific national corporate governance 
systems in particular.  
"A Theory of Path Dependence in Corporate Governance and Ownership" by Lucian Bebchuk and 
Mark Roe in this volume
1 and related earlier work by Mark Roe on path dependence and corporate 
governance
2 make valuable contributions both at the conceptual or theoretical level and at the 
substantive level. We see the main theoretical contribution in the way in which four concepts: path 
dependence, efficiency, evolution and convergence, are integrated. In his book "Strong Managers, 
Weak Owners"
3 from 1994, Roe had demonstrated that institutional features which we observe 
today are shaped by historical events which may, from today's perspective, appear to be accidental 
in nature and which may have caused today’s institutions to appear inefficient. The general lesson of 
that book is that history and politics matter, and that they probably matter more t han purely 
                                                                 
1 See Mark Roe and Lucian Bebchuk, A Theory of Path Dependence In Corporate Governance and Ownership, 
The Center for Law and Economic Studies Working Paper No. 131, Columbia Law School (4/7/98) (henceforth 
quoted as Bebchuk & Roe, working paper). References in our paper are mainly to the version of 1998. A 
thoroughly revised version of the Bebchuk & Roe paper was published as A Theory of Path Dependence In 
Corporate Ownership and Governance , 52, Stanford L. Rev. 127 (1999) (henceforth referred to as the SLR version) 
and is reprinted in this volume with slight modifications (JEFF: PLEASE CORRECT THIS IF THIS IS NOT THE 
CASE OR IF IT SHOULD NOT APPEAR HERE. IN THE FOLLOWING, I TRY TO INDICATE WHERE CORRECTIONS 
MIGHT BE RELEVANT. BUT I WOULD NOT BE TOO SURPRISED IF THE PAPER IN THE BOOK WERE THE ORIGINAL 
ONE, SINCE THERE IS A WORKING PAPER NO 131 ON COLUMBIA'S WEB SITE FROM DECEMBER 1999 WITH THE 
SAME TITLE AS THE TITLE OF THE 1998 PAPER BUT THE CONTENT OF THE SLR-VERSION. (OWNERSHIP AND 
CORPORATE  GOVERNANCE INSTEAD OF  CORPORATE  GOVERNANCE AND OWNERSHIP) S O  I  AM 
UNFORTUNATELY STILL A BIT CONFUSED. HARRY (SCHMIDT)). 
2 See in particular Mark Roe, Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 641 (1996) and Path 
Dependence, Political Options and Governance Systems, in: Comparative Corporate Governance: Essays and 
Materials 165 (Klaus J. Hopt/Eddy Wymeersch eds., Berlin/New York: de Gruyter 1997).   2
economic or efficiency-related considerations, and certainly more than the conventional wisdom in 
economics and in the law and economics community in America would suggest. In connection with 
efficiency, evolution and convergence, the concept of path dependence creates a solid theoretical 
basis for the mainly empirical accounts provided in that book and related papers.  
Bebchuk & Roe's contribution at the substantive level are the implications which they derive by 
applying these concepts to one o f the most fundamental questions in the area of corporate 
governance. Based on their insight into the importance of path dependence, Bebchuk & Roe 
challenge the predominant view among economists and law and economics scholars that the 
corporate governance systems in the major industrial countries are likely to converge rapidly to what 
is typically considered to be the most efficient system, namely the Anglo-Saxon one.
4 
The present paper is strongly inspired by the stimulating work by Mark Roe and in particular by an 
earlier version of the paper in this volume. Our paper also addresses both the conceptual and the 
substantive issues. We wish to emphasize at the outset that we completely concur with Roe and 
Bebchuk & Roe that path dependence is important as a concept and as a fact of life, and that 
convergence towards the "best" corporate governance system is  not likely to happen soon. 
However, there are also some points of disagreement on which we would like to focus in this paper. 
They may not lead to a different assessment of the main propositions in the Bebchuk & Roe paper, 
but we believe that they might turn out to be important for the future course of the debate which it 
has initiated.  
After explaining that it "might appear natural" to expect that corporate governance systems will 
converge relatively quickly since "nations and firms" are under pressure to adopt the "most efficient 
corporate governance rules and structures" in order to be internationally competitive, Bebchuk & 
Roe make it very clear that this is not their view.
5 However, towards the end of the earlier version of 
their paper, Bebchuk & Roe qualify their rejection of the established view considerably by admitting 
                                                                                                                                                                                                           
3 Cf. Mark Roe, Weak Owners, Strong Managers: The Political Roots of American Corporate Finance. Princeton 
N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994. 
4 As an example from the academic literature, see Henry Hansmann, Reinier Kraakman: The End of History for 
Corporate Law, working paper presented at the Tilburg University 1999 Conference on Convergence and 
Diversity in Corporate Governance Regimes and Capital Markets. Referring to the entire financial system, 
Raghuram Rajan and Luigi Zingales (The Politics of Financial Development, mimeo, University of Chicago, 1999) 
make the same point. A great many statements of a similar nature can be found in the popular press; see e.g. D. 
Roche:  “The 'Global' World is Anglo-Saxon”; in: Wall Street Journal Europe, 05.01.2000, and "Bidding for the 
Future", in: The Economist, Feb. 12, 2000, 75. 
5 The citations are from p. 5 of the working paper version; in the SLR version similar statements about "what 
might be thought" can be found on pp. 134f.  JEFF: PLEASE INSERT THE CORRESPONDING PAGE FROM THE 
VERSION IN THE VOLUME, if that is the same as the SLR version)   3
that the possibility to achieve great improvements in terms of efficiency brings w ith it "limits of 
persistence" of what might be inefficient institutional arrangements such as a specific national 
corporate governance system.
6 It can safely be assumed that this view is shared by many observers 
who would readily concede that convergence  is not likely to be automatic and more or less 
frictionless and who would thus basically accept the path dependence argument. 
Here we disagree, as we want to demonstrate in this paper. Our reservation is based on a different 
understanding of what constitutes, and causes, path dependence. We will therefore first discuss how 
we interpret the conceptual underpinning of path dependence (section II), and then proceed to show 
why using the concepts underlying path dependence more systematically than Roe and Bebchuk & 
Roe do in their papers, leads to different and possibly even more unexpected conclusions with 
respect to the convergence of corporate governance systems. We will argue in section III that the 
concept of path dependence has to be supplemented by an additional theoretical concept so far not 
discussed at sufficient length in the literature on corporate governance systems. The additional 
concept is complementarity. In section IV we then show that complementarity is crucial for 
understanding the dynamic properties of corporate governance systems
7 and that, if complementarity 
is recognized as a cause of path dependence, one can derive that increasing efficiency pressure may 
even lead to a convergence towards an inefficient system. 
II. Two explanations of path dependence 
In his earlier theoretical papers, Mark Roe has demonstrated that path dependence leads to 
observable results which are at odds with simple efficiency considerations. When he and Bebchuk & 
Roe contrast the outcomes of processes shaped by path dependence with those which one would 
expect under the sole influence of efficiency, they refer to a conventional notion of economic 
                                                                 
6 See p. 27 of the working paper and p. 147 of the SLR version.  
7 More generally, complementarity is crucial for understanding the characteristics and the dynamic properties of 
entire legal systems, financial systems, and other similarly complex systems. For legal systems see Gerald 
Spindler, Recht und Konzern (Law and groups of companies) (Tübingen: J.C.B.Mohr 1993), and for financial 
systems see, for example, Giangiacomo Nardozzi, National Specificities and Current Tendencies in Financial 
Systems, in: Finance and the Enterprise 247, 258-259 (Vera Zamagni ed., London: Academic Press 1992), Guiseppe 
Conti, Alternative Financial Systems in Industrial Economies, 1970-1985, ibid, 207, 227, Andreas Hackethal/Marcel 
Tyrell, Complementarity and Financial Systems: A Theoretical Approach, Finance Working Paper No. 11, 
University of Frankfurt 1998, and Andreas Hackethal/Reinhard H. Schmidt, Finanzsystem und Komplementarität, 
forthcoming in the special issue of the German journal Kredit und Kapital on "Neue finanzielle Arrangements: 
Märkte im Umbruch" (New Financial Arrangements: Markets in the State of Transformation) . The fields in which 
complementarity has recently been recognized as important include corporate structures and strategies, see Paul 
Milgrom/John Roberts, The Economics of Modern Manufacturing: Technology, Strategy, and Organization, 80 (3) 
Am. Econ. Rev. 511 (1990), and Michael E. Porter, What is Strategy?, Harv. Bus. Rev. 74, 61-78 (Nov.-Dec. 1996).   4
efficiency,
8 which is essentially static and closely connected to the standard economic concept of 
equilibrium. The combination of efficiency and equilibrium underlies most discussions in economics in 
general and in the new institutional economics in particular.
9 Although the standard efficiency concept 
is static, it suggests that convergence from a given institutional arrangement to the most efficient - or 
simply "best" - one is to be expected; and in a perfect neo-classical setting, a generalization from a 
static to a dynamic, or multi-period, equilibrium is indeed straightforward. It would not change the 
qualitative results and would thus equally suggest convergence. Thus the conventional static concepts 
include what one might call an implicit view of institutional dynamics.  
The concept of path dependence which is employed in the papers by Roe and Bebchuk & Roe is 
also based on the combination of efficiency and equilibrium. However, it adds two elements to the 
standard economic approach. One is that of "realistic" assumptions like those of bounded rationality 
and imperfect and incomplete markets. The second addition is institutional dynamics. Outside of a 
perfect neoclassical setting, dynamic issues pose genuine problems. An analysis including theses two 
elements leads to different conclusions than the standard static efficiency analysis. This suggests that 
one ought to take a closer look at the nature and the causes of path dependence. In the earlier work 
of Roe and in the joint paper by Bebchuk & Roe we see elements of two different interpretations of 
path dependence, which should, in our view, be carefully distinguished. 
1. Path dependence as a consequence of switching costs 
The central argument for path dependence goes like this: Factors determining efficiency change over 
time (wolves are no longer where they used to be, to use Roe's instructive example). Therefore a 
once efficient arrangement (the winding path which avoids the wolves' den) becomes "inefficient" 
from today's perspective. However, given that the possible efficiency or welfare gain brought about 
by changing an institutional arrangement (by building a straight road) may not be sufficient to cover 
the costs of adjustment, "society" might rationally keep the seemingly inefficient institutions (the 
winding road).
10 So in spite of the initial appearance, what we observe in reality may be efficient in a 
broader sense, n amely with the adjustment or switching costs being taken into account. To this 
                                                                 
8 It is not exactly the concept of Pareto-efficiency, but does not differ significantly from this concept as amended 
by the Kaldor-Hicks-criterion. So one could simply replace the technical term “efficient” by the colloquial 
"better". 
9 As a source, see, for example, Eirik G. Furubotn/Rudolf Richter, Institutions and Economic Theory 458, 475 (Ann 
Arbor: Michigan University Press 1997), who discuss the efficiency and equilibrium concepts used in most of that 
literature.  
10 Cf. Roe, supra n. 109 Harv. L. Rev. 641, 643 (1996).   5
methodological rule Roe adds the empirical conjecture that apparent inefficiencies are frequent and 
important, and - or rather because - switching costs can be high and are probably higher than 
advocates of the conventional evolutionary argument implicit in American-style law and economics 
tend to believe.
11  
Note that in this standard account of path dependence there is nothing which prevents the reader 
from interpreting "society" as a single rational, efficiency-oriented decision making unit. Therefore, 
similar considerations also apply to the production technology employed in an owner-managed firm 
or the energy conservation devices used in a private home, which may appear inefficient today. 
Details of how the production plant or the home were originally built determine which improvements 
may have been advisable in the meantime and thus ultimately also how the plant or the home look 
today.
12  
Adjustment or switching costs are a fact of life, and there can be no doubt that they "matter". Roe's 
paradigmatic story of the winding path - and more so our story of the plant or the home owner - 
suggests that the notion of path dependence is quite simple and that the adjustment or transformation 
or switching costs which lead to path dependence are mainly a technological fact. We therefore call 
the first interpretation of path dependence the "switching cost story".  
However, switching costs are not by definition technological in nature. There is a difference between 
the technical and the social aspects of institutional development, and the paradigmatic example of the 
path whose course depends on history tends to obscure this difference. A simple technology-based 
explanation of path dependence is not enough when the decision as to whether or not to switch from 
an existing institutional arrangement to a “better” one is not made by one single economic unit. In 
social or political processes, adjustment costs - and thus path dependence - are attributable to, 
among other things, sunk costs
13, entrenched property and decision rights of interest groups and 
network externalities.
14 All of these non-technical features are likely to impede efficiency-enhancing 
                                                                 
11 See Roberta Romano, The Genius of American Corporate Law (Washington: AEI Press 1993), as probably the 
most prominent proponent of the view which Roe criticizes. 
12 It is in the spirit of the economic paradigm to assume that, as rational decision makers who carefully compare 
the costs and benefits of making improvements, the owners have, over the course of time, undertaken all those 
improvements which appeared worthwhile to them at the time at which decisions concerning these improvements 
could have been made. 
13 Note that sunk costs may be the result of an intentional action, or a commitment device, designed and 
implemented in order to make future changes difficult. 
14 Network externalities are especially relevant in the case of common standards. Examples of technical standards 
like QWERTY, video cassette or computer software systems illustrate that markets do not seem able to leave a 
given path which was once chosen even if products prove to be technically suboptimal. The relevant literature 
discusses why this might be so; see Paul A. David, Clio and the Economics of QWERTY, 75 (2) Am. Econ. Rev.   6
changes.
15 Thus, whether an improvement in efficiency or aggregate welfare comes about or not 
depends crucially on the details of the relevant processes.
16  
2. Path dependence as a consequence of evolutionary myopia 
Roe also offers a second concept or explanation of path dependence. This concept is based on 
recent developments in evolutionary biology.
17 The main proposition here is that the processes of 
evolution lead systems only to local optima. By definition, a local optimum may be different from a 
global optimum. As what constitutes the nearest, and seemingly most attractive, local optimum 
depends on the starting point at which a given biological or social system happens to be at a given 
point in time, and as the set of obtainable local optima changes over time, different systems can 
develop in different ways. Thus, the development of such a system is path dependent. All that is 
needed for the biologists' story to be convincing is the assumption of a certain degree of myopia on 
the part of the entities which are assumed to behave as if they made rational choices under external 
pressure. Note that evolutionary mechanisms which may lead to path dependence can be assumed to 
work even in the absence of all switching costs as long as switching costs are not defined in such a 
broad way that they include all consequences of myopia.  
Another important element of the biologists' story is that, in the course of time, options which existed 
at some date, and may even have been "better" then, may disappear if they are not "chosen". This 
would certainly give rise to path dependence. As a consequence, social processes of evolution may 
lead to a situation in which the relevant social system only reaches a local optimum which is, or at 
least was at least at that time, not the global optimum. As Roe writes, "[m]odern evolutionary 
                                                                                                                                                                                                           
332 (1985), Stan J. Liebowitz/Steven E. Margolis, Network Externalities: An Uncommon Tragedy, 8 (2) J. Econ. 
Persp. 133 (1994) and Günter Knieps, Standards und die Grenzen der unsichtbaren Hand, 45 Jahrbuch für die 
Ordnung in Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft (ORDO) 51 (1994). 
15 They are discussed by Bebchuk & Roe, supra n. 1, on pp. 21-23 of the working paper and pp. 139-141 of the 
SLR version. [ JEFF,  PLEASE INSERT THE REFERENCE TO THE VOLUME WHICH YOU ARE EDITING, IF THAT 
SHOULD BE APPROPRIATE HERE IN LIEU OF THE REFERENCE TO THE SLR VERSION!!] 
16 At least on a theoretical level there are cases in which social decision processes are similar to single-person 
decision processes. One of these is when there is a system of complete and perfect markets; in this case all 
decision makers are unanimous as to what is the best social arrangement. Another case, which is addressed 
implicitly by Bebchuck & Roe, when they discuss "rules that destroy positional advantage" on p.28 of their 
working paper and p. 148 of the SLR version, is that of a powerful, but somewhat benevolent, dictatorship. The 
dictator does not (have to) discuss his decisions with others, and he can disregard existing property rights when 
he makes decisions based only on his assessment of aggregate welfare. In other cases, there is indeed a co-
ordination problem for which a solution is not obvious. 
17See Roe, supra n. 2, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 641, 643, 663 (1996) and the references provided there.     7
biologists use the metaphor of natural selection leading us to the top of a local hill."
18 We therefore 
call this second explanation of path dependence the "local hill story".  
3. Comparing the two explanations 
Even though the two alternative explanations of path dependence may not be mutually exclusive and 
even if one could be regarded as a special case of the other, we nevertheless think that it is important 
to distinguish between them as they shed light on different facts and therefore suggest different 
implications. This becomes most obvious when we look at an important corollary of path 
dependence. As mentioned before, Bebchuk & Roe claim that "(large) inefficiencies" limit (the) 
persistence of institutional arrangements which are no longer up to date.
19 We interpret this statement 
as saying that as long as the external pressure is not too strong, different institutional arrangements 
may coexist side by side even though they differ with respect to the efficiency with which they fulfil 
the same function. However, when the pressure becomes too strong, path dependence does not 
seem to count so much any more, and only the more efficient arrangement survives.
20  
Such a view would be plainly consistent with the "switching costs story" and is also in line with 
established views in economics: The more that can be gained from undertaking certain improvements 
and the more that would be lost by forgoing them, the more improvements will be undertaken by 
rational agents, be they individuals or "society" acting as if it were a single individual. Strong pressure 
will even force the decision makers to adopt the global optimum as switching to it offers the highest 
probability that the benefits of a change will outweigh the cost of adjustment. If more pressure leads 
to more improvement and if that pressure is applied equally to different systems, it ultimately also 
leads to more convergence, provided that the same institutional arrangement is perceived by all 
agents who make the decisions under consideration to be the global optimum.  
In the light of the story inspired by evolutionary biology, this view is much less plausible. Here sudden 
outside pressure leads, in the first place, to reactions which appear to short-sighted decision 
                                                                 
18 See supra n. 2, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 641, 643 (1996). 
19 See supra n. 6.  
20 Bebchuk & Roe demonstrate these limits in the well-defined context of their economic model. There they refer to 
"(large) inefficiencies", and not to the strength of the pressure to achieve a gain in efficiency, as the reason for 
these limits. In the type of model which the authors present in their paper, the pressure is always implicitly 
assumed to be so strong that any gain in efficiency is exploited by the agents. Different degrees of this pressure 
would be extremely difficult to model; but this does not imply that such differences do not play an important role 
in reality as well as in the common intuitive understanding which experts may have about this aspect of reality.   8
makers
21 to offer the highest potential to solve the acute problem. Assume there is a firm which has 
various options to improve the efficiency of its operations, and that all of a sudden the intensity of 
competition increases; a "globalization shock" hits this firm. In order to survive, the firm needs to do 
"something", and needs to do it very quickly, in order to avoid a crisis. If the reaction has to be fast 
and is myopic it may lead the firm to a local optimum, which is not a global optimum. Attempts to 
leave the local optimum in order to attain - or more precisely: to search for - a global optimum may 
simply not be feasible if the firm does not have enough financial reserves to survive the losses which it 
will incur in the process of transition.
22 Thus the evolution of this firm will turn out to be path 
dependent. 
What does this imply for convergence? If several such firms are hit by the "globalization shock", they 
will all attempt to improve their lot and undertake some efficiency-enhancing measures, each one 
using the option which offers the best immediate prospect. If they are in different starting positions 
when the event occurs, the different firms may end up at different local optima and might be stuck 
there. Convergence does not occur if the outside pressure prevents them from experimenting and 
perhaps finding the - common - global optimum. In fact, stronger outside pressure will decrease the 
likelihood that convergence will occur, because with very strong pressure the danger that temporary 
deviations from a local optimum would lead to losses and the eventual failure of a firm are greater. 
Not more, but less outside pressure would make it easier for the individual firms to "accidentally" 
move to the global optimum and thus to "converge".  
There is one situation in which increasing outside pressure like a globalization shock leads to an 
observable result which appears indistinguishable from convergence. It is the case in which the 
outside pressure is so strong that all those firms which have attained a local optimum which is not at 
the same time a global one cannot survive, and in which there is only one global optimum. Then the 
survivors all look alike. However, we think that it is important to distinguish between seeming 
convergence based on elimination of most of the entities under consideration which are different, and 
true convergence in which entities adjust in such a way that they become (more) similar.  
We do not want to speculate on whether the "switching costs story" is less useful and relevant than 
that of the "local hill" in general. In part our reservation vis-à-vis the explanation of path dependence 
as arising from the costs of making adjustments is due to the ad hoc character of the concept of 
                                                                 
21 Note the metaphorical character of theses sentences: In biological evolution, there are no "decision makers"; 
instead, some entities act in a way which we interpret as if it involved rational choices on their part.   9
switching costs. There is no general definition of what counts as adjustment or switching costs, and 
therefore almost anything can be explained by invoking suitably defined switching costs. However, it 
is a basic insight of the philosophy of science that concepts which can explain everything do in fact 
explain nothing. In this respect adjustment or switching costs are like transaction costs, which have 
for a long time played such a prominent role in the new institutional economics literature and have 
been seriously challenged on methodological grounds as being an "empty box".
23  
A different, and i n our view more important, reason why we regard the competing explanation, 
namely that path dependence may be due to the short-sightedness of evolution, as more interesting 
and more relevant in the case of corporate governance systems, is that it yields different and more 
interesting implications for the central issue of the convergence of national corporate governance 
systems. However, in order for the "local hill story" to fully develop its heuristic potential, it needs to 
be enriched; the story, or more precisely the theoretical argument, needs more structure in order to 
be meaningful. It is our methodological proposition that the enrichment can be achieved by adding 
the concept of complementarity. We therefore now turn to presenting this concept. 
III. Complementarity as an explanation for path dependence 
1. Why complementarity is important  
The Bebchuk & Roe paper is motivated by the puzzlement of the authors over the fact that 
economically very successful countries like the U.S., Britain, Germany and Japan have vastly 
different corporate governance and ownership systems.
24 This fact does indeed call for an 
explanation. If different corporate governance and ownership systems, such as the German and the 
American systems, were equally good for the countries and the firms operating under them, or if 
corporate governance systems were irrelevant for the success of firms and countries, there would not 
be a reason to be surprised by the fact that corporate governance systems differ as much as they 
do.
25 But one can rule out both of these explanations for the persistence of evident differences 
between corporate governance systems of economically equally successful countries as being highly 
                                                                                                                                                                                                           
22 A well functioning capital market may make the transition possible by financing temporary losses. 
23  The classical critical quote is Stanley Fisher, Long-Term Contracting, Sticky Prices and Monetary Policy: A 
Comment, 3 J. Monetary Econ. 317, 322 (1977): "Transaction costs have a well-deserved bad name as a theoretical 
device ..... because there is a suspicion that almost anything can be rationalized by invoking suitably specified 
transaction costs."  
24 See Bebchuk & Roe, supra n. 1, pp. 1, 4 of the working paper and p. 129 of the SLR version. 
25 This puzzlement has been a main driver for the comparative corporate governance research by American law 
scholars for a long time; see Mark Roe, Comparative Corporate Governance (The New Palgrave Dictionary of 
Economics and the Law, Vol. 1, P. Newman, ed., London: Longman 1999), 339.    10
implausible. The fact that some countries hold on to strange and, as it seems, inefficient systems - in 
particular Germany with its mandatory codetermination - can only be explained with recourse to path 
dependence: Switching to a better system would cause costs which are too high in comparison to 
what could be gained by adopting that system; and in the past the pressure to improve corporate 
governance systems was not strong enough. The economic prowess of Germany and Japan has up 
to now allowed these countries the luxury of their "antiquated" systems.
26 With globalisation 
increasing the competitive pressure on all countries, one could feel inclined, following Bebchuk & 
Roe, to believe that this situation might come to an end at least in the medium term, if "efficiency limits 
persistence". 
This may be right, and it may also be the case that the German system is simply not good after all. Be 
that as it may; but as long as Bebchuk & Roe are not more specific about what causes these 
countries' corporate governance systems to be so strongly path dependent, the simple statement that 
there is path dependence does not tell us enough. There is an element missing in their analysis, and 
this element is complementarity.  
In our view, the case for the importance of path dependence could be strengthened considerably by 
giving much more weight to the concept of complementarity. In order to prepare our argument why 
we think that complementarity is indeed very important, we start by defining what we mean by 
complementarity, then demonstrate that complementarity is an important feature of national corporate 
governance systems. Next we indicate briefly what normative implications can be derived from 
taking complementarity into account more fully, and conclude with what we consider to be the most 
relevant positive implication of corporate governance: namely  that it is not necessarily the more 
efficient corporate governance system which will survive in the end.    
                                                                 
26 Though he says so more implicitly than explicitly in earlier articles, Roe seems to believe that the Anglo-Saxon 
system is better than the German system; and even though such a premise is not implied in the joint paper with 
Bebchuk, nothing in the Bebchuk & Roe paper contradicts this assessment. See on this issue Mark Roe, German 
Codetermination and German Securities Markets, Col. Bus. L. Rev. 167 (1998), in which the author discusses the 
example of the German system of mandatory codetermination to demonstrate that path dependence is important 
and has, in his view, clearly negative welfare effects. In this assessment, Roe`s view is similar to those of many 
other authors with a common law background, cf. for example Romano, supra n.  11, p. 133, and Bernard 
Black/Reinier Kraakman, A self-enforcing model of corporate law, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 1911, 1974 (1996). Interestingly 
enough, this firm conviction has shifted remarkably since the eighties when Japanese keiretsus and other insider-
control systems were en vogue in the U.S. and the economic performance of Japan seemed to be better than that 
of the U.S. Later in this paper, we will comment briefly on why we consider Roe's assessment of the German 
system of codetermination to be overly negative, see n. 36 below.   11
2. What is complementarity?  
Complementarity is an attribute of elements of a given system, and consistency is the corresponding 
attribute of entire systems. Elements of a system are complementary (to each other) if they "fit 
together", i.e. mutually increase their "benefit" in terms of whatever the objective function or the 
standard for evaluating the system may be, and/or mutually reduce their disadvantages or "costs". 
Although the concepts of complementarity and consistency are quite intuitive, as they come close to 
what is implied when we talk informally about something being "really a system", and a standard tool 
of microeconomic analysis, a brief and very simple formal representation may be helpful for the 
ensuing discussion.
27 
Let a system consist of four elements a, b, c and d. Each one of theses elements can take on two 
values such as a1 and a2. Also assume that there is a measure which permits a pairwise ordering of 
systems as being "better" or "not better". Now let there be two systems S1 and S2 that each constitute 
a local optima with S1 being composed of the choices a1, b1, c1 and d1, and S2 of the choices a2, b2, c2 
and d2, and two systems S1* and S2* (each with an asterisk to indicate their respective analogues) in 
which only the value taken on by one element, the element a, has been exchanged. We call the 
elements a, b, c, d complementary to each other if the following relationships hold for the element a 
(and similarly for the elements b, c and d):  
  S1(a1, b1, c1, d1) is better than S1*(a2, b1, c1, d1)  
   S2(a2, b2, c2, d2) is better than S2*(a1, b2, c2, d2)  
even though, according to widely held opinion,
28 considered in isolation  
   a2  is regarded as being better than a1    
and irrespective of whether  
S1(a1, b1, c1, d1) is better than S2(a2, b2, c2, d2).
29  
                                                                 
27 More complex formalizations can be found in, for example, Paul Milgrom/John Roberts, Economics, Organization 
and Management, pp. 191-199 (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall 1992), id., Complementarities and Fit: Strategy, 
Structure, and Organizational Change in Manufacturing, 19 J. of Accounting and Econ. 179 (1995), and 
Hackethal/Schmidt, supra n. 7. 
28 The ranking of the choices for the elements considered in isolation does not make sense in a decision-theoretic 
framework as these choices need to be evaluated in the context of the system to which they belong. Therefore the 
statement about the ranking can only be a behavioral statement about how elements are generally, e.g. by the 
relevant group of practitioners, perceived or assessed.   
29 The above conditions are only necessary conditions. A sufficient condition for complementarity is that 
simultaneously increasing the value of any two or more variables (elements) of a system must at least yield the 
same efficiency gain as the sum of incremental gains from increasing each variable alone.   12
Correspondingly, we call S1 and S2 consistent systems and S1* and S2* inconsistent systems. Intuitively 
speaking, in comparison to S1* and S2* the systems S1 and S2 are better because the values of the 
complementary elements have a better fit. In a situation like the one described by the four 
relationships, what matters more is the consistency of the systems, i.e. the differences in value 
between S1* and S1 (and S2* and S2) rather than the "values" of the individual elements of which they 
are composed, and it matters even more than the values of the consistent systems (the absolute 
difference in value between S1 and S2) themselves. As an empirical conjecture we would like to add 
that situations in which complementarity/consistency are more important, than even the "values" of the 
entire systems are more frequent in social life than is commonly assumed by economists and scholars 
from related disciplines.  
We provide a further illustration because it may make the relationship between complementarity and 
path dependence easier to understand. If the system under consideration is physical production with 
one output and two factors of production, than we call the factors complementary if the marginal 
productivity of each factor increases at an increasing rate with the amount to which the other factor 
is used. Note that in this case the output surface looks different from that of the standard production-
theoretic model in which marginal productivity of one factor decreases with increasing use of the 
other factor. In the three-dimensional graphical representation of the standard model of production, 
output can be represented as a mountain leveling o ff at its sides, whereas in the case of 
complementarity the output surface looks like a valley in a mountainous region or like a mountainous 
region with more than one hill. Any substantial "improvement" in output is tantamount to walking up 
the mountain slope on one side of the valley in which the hiker happens to be when she starts her 
climb. A short-sighted hiker would strive for height (efficiency gains) by climbing up that side of the 
valley on which she happened to be or which appeared steeper to her. This would constitute myopic 
behavior, which might well lead her to a hill top which is not the highest peak in the entire area, i.e. 
she might wander towards a local maximum.  
3. Complementarity and path dependence 
Complementarity and path dependence are closely connected concepts as complementarity leads 
directly to path dependence as a dynamic property of systems. By definition, there is no way to 
reach a higher peak without going down from a local peak. Thus, striving for immediate gains in 
height is very likely to make a hiker's stroll a path dependent one: It matters where she started to 
climb up and where she reaches a (local) maximum.   13
We claim, and by using the formalization from above wish to illustrate, that consistent systems change 
differently from entities which are not systems by our definition,
30 because in real life the change in a 
system is typically initiated by altering just one of several elements.  
Assume for the moment that system S2 is perceived by some observers to be better than system S1 
and that, possibly because of this, some external influence leads to the replacement of the seemingly 
"worse" element a1 by the "better" element a2 in what was initially the consistent system S1. The 
resulting system is S1* which is by definition inconsistent. As inconsistency means that the system is 
not "good" and in fact strictly inferior in efficiency or aggregate welfare terms to the corresponding 
consistent system (S1) there will be pressure for more efficiency gain and adjustment. One possible 
adjustment would consist in the modification of the other elements b, c and d such that the entire 
system S1 is ultimately replaced by the presumed better system S2. The other possible adjustment is 
one which reflected the system's attempt to increase efficiency immediately or "myopically", and this 
can be achieved by simply restoring consistency. A fast efficiency-increasing move would consist in 
reversing the original move from a1 to a2 - and thus in a return from S1* to S1. In certain applications, 
and in particular in a situation in which it would be important to quickly achieve some efficiency gain, 
the second form of adjustment is more likely. This is why systems under strong pressure are likely to 
be "trapped" in a local optimum like the consistent system S1 in much the same way as the second 
explanation for path dependence discussed above suggests for the case of biological evolution and in 
the same way that Bebchuk & Roe analyze in their paper. 
IV. Complementarity and Corporate Governance 
1. Consistent corporate governance systems 
National corporate governance systems that are at least somewhat functional must be consistent or, 
in other words, must be composed of complementary elements which fit together – or constitute a 
consistent system - in the sense just defined. A governance system can be described by listing its 
(important) elements and indicating which values these elements take on. The list of important 
elements includes  
•  the distribution of ownership and decision rights (concentrated or dispersed)  
•  the financial structure of corporations (more or less leverage, among other aspects) 
                                                                 
30 The limiting case would be the simultaneous change of the values of all elements and thus of the system itself. 
In this case the systemic property is ruled out as irrelevant for ranking purposes and the system is just a normal   14
•  the board structure (unitary or dual board system) 
•  capital requirements (mandatory or not; strict or liberal) 
•  the general structure of corporate law (mandatory or enabling)  
•  the quality of accounting information from a shareholders' perspective (transparent or opaque)  
•  access to capital markets (easy or difficult; general or restricted) 
•  the nature of stock market regulation (strict or not so strict) including insider trading regulation and 
the possibility of unfriendly takeovers (possible or impossible; easy or difficult)  
•  the dominant career paths in firms (predominantly internal or more open to outsiders)  
•  the role of employees in corporate decision making (existing or not; mandatory or not),  
and many others. Evidently, not all conceivable values for these individual elements would fit together 
and generate a workable corporate governance system and also an efficient organizational 
structure.
31 The distinction between the Anglo-Saxon "outsider control system" and the German-
Japanese "insider control system" introduced by Franks and Mayer aptly reflects our notion of 
complementarity or of a genuine, consistent system. The two prototypical systems are very specific 
combinations of the values of a given set of "important" elements of corporate governance systems.
32  
In the Anglo-Saxon outsider control system, the market for corporate control plays the central role, 
while internal control mechanisms are of only secondary importance. In order for such a system to 
function, it must be assumed that all shareholders are (almost) equally well informed,
33 that very strict 
insider trading prohibitions and duties of loyalty prevent the abuse of any informational advantage 
which might still exist; and that managers have the single duty of maximizing the value of the firm for 
its current shareholders, which in turn presupposes dispersed ownership and well-developed capital 
markets. Such a system is consistent and the principles on which it rests are relatively simple. Further 
complementary elements include the absence of any form of codetermination and bank-lender 
relationships which are at arm's length.   
                                                                                                                                                                                                           
"thing" like any other.  
31 See the discussion of complementarity as a prerequisite for successful business systems in Milgrom/Roberts, 
supra n. 7 and n. 27, Economics, Organization and Management, pp. 108-110. 
32 See Julian Franks/Colin Mayer, Ownership and Control, in: Trends in Business Organization: Do Participation 
and Cooperation Increase Competitiveness? 171 (Horst Siebert ed., Tübingen: J.C.B.Mohr 1995), and the 
comparison of different classifications in Erik Berglöf, Reforming Corporate Governance: Redirecting the 
European Agenda, 24 Econ. Policy 91 (April 1997) and id., A note on the typology of financial systems, in: 
Comparative Corporate Governance: Essays and Materials 151 (Klaus J. Hopt/Eddy Wymeersch eds., Berlin/New 
York: de Gruyter 1997). The classification by Franks/Mayer is further refined in Hackethal/Schmidt, supra n. 7.  
33 The fear that she might be informationally disadvantaged can prevent a shareholder from accepting a seemingly 
attractive tender offer, and thus undermine the functioning of the takeover mechanism.   15
As its name rightly suggests, in an "insider control system" the internal mechanisms for monitoring the 
management, such as the supervisory board, must function. This has the inevitable consequence that 
some people are better informed than others, and it requires that they have opportunities to benefit 
from their monitoring of management activity because otherwise they would hardly be prepared to 
invest the effort required to act as monitors of the management.
34 On the other hand, the potentially 
well informed monitors should not be in a position to abuse their informational advantages. So there 
must be mutual monitoring of the well-informed "inside" monitors of management, as can in principle 
be achieved if the boards of corporations are composed of people who represent powerful groups 
of stakeholders. Such a composition of the supervisory board makes a large company a coalition of 
stakeholder groups. As in this system the supervisory board is as well the arena for co-operation 
with respect to the function of monitoring the management as that for conflict with respect to the 
specific interests of the different stakeholder groups, it is imperative that its functions be clearly 
separated from those of the management board. The insider control system cannot function without a 
de jure or de facto two-tier board structure. Given the composition of the supervisory board and its 
role vis-à-vis the management, it is also evident that exclusive reliance on shareholder value as the 
corporate objective and as the yardstick for the performance of management can also not be part of 
this system.
35  
If  banks play a strong role in the governance of companies, an insider system tends to function 
better. The same holds in principle if there is a well-conceived system of employee representation, be 
it mandatory or not. There even is a certain coincidence of interests between banks as lenders and 
employees. Both benefit from a stable and safe development of the company in question, and a 
supervisory board whose function is neatly separated from that of the management board provides a 
                                                                 
34 Arguing from an economic perspective, one could say that there must be a reward for the monitoring effort. 
This reward can come from using information. From a formalistic legal perspective this seems highly questionable. 
Members of a supervisory board are not allowed to use the information which they gain from serving on a board; 
see, for the case of Germany, Marcus Lutter, Information und Vertraulichkeit im Aufsichtsrat (Information and 
confidentiality in the supervisory board) (2
nd ed., Köln: Carl Heymann 1984). However, there seems to be a gap 
between theory and practice or, in other words, a blurred legal distinction between the use and the abuse of 
information instead of a strict prohibition of any use whatsoever.  
35 On the different roles and interpretations of the concept of shareholder value in the insider and outsider 
systems from an economic and legal perspective, cf. Reinhard H. Schmidt/Gerald Spindler, Shareholder-Value 
zwischen Ökonomie und Recht (shareholder value regarded from an economic and a legal perspective), in: 
Wirtschafts- und Medienrecht in der offenen Demokratie 515, 528, 534 (H.-D. Assmann et al. eds., Heidelberg: 
C.F.Müller 1997), and, as an English summary of the main economic argument, Reinhard H.Schmidt, Corporate 
Governance: The Role of Other Constituencies, in: Corporate Governance: Les Perspectives Internationales, 61 
(A. Pezard/J.-M. Thiveaud, eds., Paris: Montchrétien 1997).   16
suitable framework in which banks and employee representatives can provide their input into the 
governance system.
36  
On the other hand, the role of the stock market in its dual capacity as a source of performance 
measures and as a market for corporate control must not be too strong if the coalition of strong 
stakeholders is to be able to function. An insider system is consistent. However, it is certainly not one 
whose functioning is assured easily. With a restricted role of the stock market and the maximization 
of total value
37 as an objective which is inherently fuzzy and not operational and therefore leaves too 
much discretion for the management, the main problem of the insider system is that of finding a sound 
balance between co-operation and conflict among the different stakeholder groups so that their 
coalition can and does effectively monitor the management.  
The prototypical outsider and insider control systems, which bear close resemblance to the British 
and American systems and the German and Japanese systems respectively, as they existed some 
                                                                 
36 Their joint influence is likely to lead to a situation in which the interests of shareholders are not taken care of to 
a great extent. We would like to acknowledge that Roe, supra n. 26, is perfectly right in calling the German system 
of (mandatory) codetermination a very good example of path dependency due to complementarity in the sense of 
elements of a system being mutually dependent on one another. However, the more encompassing system in 
question with which codetermination is largely compatible is a very complex one, including as additional elements 
not only the stock markets which Roe discusses in this context, but also labor law and company law, social 
mechanisms and traditions of conflict resolution, the structure of the legal system, the pension system, and many 
more. In so far as codetermination fits into this overall German social, political, economic and legal environment it 
may also have certain efficiency properties: If the other elements were different from what they are in Germany, 
codetermination might be less attractive in economic terms. (Note that it does not make sense to assess one 
element of a genuine system in isolation.) Finally we also fully concur with Roe's assessment that the mere 
existence and in particular the mandatory nature of German codetermination tends to make an overall change of 
the German corporate governance system very difficult.  
However, all of this does not in itself support the assessment in Roe, supra n. 26, that the German corporate 
governance system of insider control, with which codetermination seems to be compatible at least in principle, is 
also a "bad" system. We do not have the space to argue why codetermination might appear quite efficient in a 
time in which firm-specific human capital is becoming more and more important (but see Bertelsmann-Stiftung und 
Hans-Böckler-Stiftung  (eds.), Mitbestimmung und neue Unternehmenskulturen  – Bilanz und Perspektiven 
(Codetermination and new corporate cultures  – a stock-taking and a perspective) (Gütersloh: Bertelsmann 
Stiftung 1998), pp. 28, 71, on this aspect). There are also empirical arguments to the effect that the economic merits 
of some elements of codetermination are more widely accepted today than in the past. Several large European 
companies have recently agreed to the introduction of "European workers' councils" in countries in which 
codetermination is not required by law; see for example Roger Blanpain/Paul Windey, European Works Councils, 
2. ed. 1994, Brian Bercusson, Die Vertretung der Arbeitnehmer im Konzern nach britischem Recht (Labor 
representation in groups of companies according to British law), 9 Zeitschrift für Internationales und 
Ausländisches Arbeits- und Sozialrecht 490 (1995) and Peter Mozet, Vereinbarungen über Europäische 
Betriebsräte (Agreements concerning European works councils), 50 Der Betrieb 477 (1997). 
In spite of our statement that codetermination is compatible with the German insider control system, we would not 
want to claim that German-style mandatory codetermination is a necessary element of any workable insider 
control system, or that the institutional design of codetermination could not be improved in such a way that it 
better supported the working of corporate governance in Germany. 
37 Cf. Margaret Blair, Ownership and Control: Rethinking Corporate Governance for the 21
st Century, 275ff 
(Washington: Brookings 1995), and Schmidt/Spindler, supra n. 35, at 533.   17
years ago,
38 do not merely demonstrate the meaning and the importance of the terms and the 
concepts of complementarity and consistency. Their juxtaposition and the demonstration that their 
respective elements need to be complementary also have important normative and positive 
implications to which we turn now.  
2. Normative implications of complementarity 
The essential normative implication of the preceding discussion is straightforward in principle, though 
not in practice. Given functional complementarity between the elements and the need for systemic 
coherence, it would probably not make too much sense to mix the outsider and insider control 
systems and to combine those elements which appear to be particularly valuable in each of the two 
systems in order to create the "overall optimum". Using the formal representation introduced above, 
it would amount to making a change from the consistent systems S 1 and S 2 to some inconsistent 
systems like S 1* and S 2*. A "middle of the road" model of corporate governance is not likely to be 
viable and can, therefore, not be recommended from an economic perspective.  
The context of European integration, which also addresses the possible harmonization of corporate 
governance systems, provides an example. It would not necessarily improve the British corporate 
governance system if "important" elements were introduced into it which observers, regulators or 
legislators find useful in the German system, and vice versa. Instead of obtaining "the best of both 
worlds" these presumed improvements might only lead to an inconsistent and dysfunctional mixture. 
Certain tendencies that are observable in Europe as it becomes more and more unified can be 
interpreted as examples of precisely this attempt to combine elements of what is considered to be 
good corporate governance in one system with elements of the other in an indiscriminate manner and 
without regard for the requirements of consistency.
39 In Britain, elements of an insider control system 
are being pushed these days, based on the findings of the Cadbury commission and on a general 
reappraisal of the role which institutional investors can – and, according to some observers, should - 
                                                                 
38 For an elaboration of the systemic properties and empirical evidence that the "neat" correspondence between 
theoretical and empirical corporate governance systems is currently giving way to a much less clear-cut situation, 
see Peter Knobling, Die Interdependenz von Unternehmensverfassung und Unternehmensfinanzierung bei 
börsennotierten Aktiengesellschaften (the interdependence between corporate governance and corporate 
financing in the case of listed corporations), chap. 5 (PhD dissertation, University of Frankfurt 1996). 
39 References can be found in Berglöff, supra n. 32, 24 Econ. Policy 91, 93 (April 1997), and in Bebchuk & Roe, 
supra n. 1, note 8.   18
play in the governance of British companies.
40 In Germany, there have been recent legislative efforts 
to foster the role of capital markets
41 and strong public pronouncements to the effect that it is time to 
adopt a strict shareholder value orientation as the governing principle of publicly held large German 
corporations.
42 Many of these measures entail the danger that the basis on which the British system 
used to rest, and that which used to underpin the German system, will no longer be solid in the future. 
To our knowledge, in both countries the consistency of the respective system has never even been 
addressed in the policy deliberations as an aspect which should be taken into account.
43  
However, we should mention a risk inherent in overstating our case for consistency or systemic 
purity. To do so might serve to impede reforms which are useful even if they are not strictly 
compatible with the basic structure of the respective systems. We would not rule out the possibility 
that several of the newly introduced measures in the U.K., where the role of outside directors has 
recently been strengthened, and the belated legal prohibition of insider trading in Germany constitute 
improvements in spite of their tendency to compromise the consistency of the outsider and insider 
control systems, respectively. We must admit in all frankness that we do not know how a balance 
between these two effects  – reduction of systemic coherence versus general improvement 
irrespective of the system’s structure - should be struck. 
3. Positive implications: complementarity and "non-convergence" 
What does complementarity imply for the possible convergence of real corporate governance 
systems? Conventional wisdom in the law and economics community would have it that a vaguely 
described process of competition among systems leads to the result that the best corporate 
governance system will be uniformly applied, in much the same way as competition in the market for 
                                                                 
40 Cf. Jonathan Charkham, Keeping Good Company: A Comparison of Corporate Governance in Five Countries 
342 (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1994), based, among others, on the (British) Report of the Commission of the 
Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance (Cadbury Report) . 
41 The example which come to our minds here are the changes which have been introduced recently in Germany 
by the "law for improving control and transparency in the economy" (KonTraG) and the Law to facilitate the 
raising of capital (Kapitalaufnahmeerleichterungsgesetz) Clearly, the overall thrust of this legislation is inspired 
by a market-oriented philosophy. Cf. the motives of the German Federal Government for the draft, 17 Zeitschrift 
für Wirtschaftsrecht (ZIP) 2129 (1996), which are evidently not consistent with the model of German corporate 
governance, and more generally of the German financial and economic system. 
42 See Manager-Magazin 4/1996, 146 (152); a criticism of some of the argument which are advanced to support 
these pleas can be found in Reinhard H. Schmidt/Jens Massmann: Drei Mißverständniss zum Thema 'Shareholder 
Value' (Three misunderstandings relating to the concept of shareholder value), 125 Unternehmensethik und die 
Transformation des Wettbewerbs (B. Kumar et al. eds. Stuttgart: Schäffer-Poeschel 1999). 
43 Raising such concerns is a role which academic research can have vis-à-vis the political process. This shows 
that Roe's skepticism (supra n. 2, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 641, 667 (1996)) that the concept of path dependence does not 
lead to policy recommendations goes too far. Though it may not yield "direct policy prescription(s)", it does lead   19
steel will advance the best steel-making technology and ultimately lead to its universal adoption 
because some will adopt it and others who do not will be driven out of the market.
44 We share the 
skepticism of Bebchuk & Roe concerning this view with respect to corporate governance systems. It 
leaves too many questions unanswered: What is the best governance system? How could a possible 
process of change occur? Who are the relevant actors in this process, and what drives their 
agendas? If we wish to answer these questions, we must look at the details of change processes.  
There can be no doubt that there is at present a growing pressure on firms and nations to improve 
economic efficiency, among other things by introducing the "best" corporate governance system. 
However, it is difficult to imagine how this "introduction" could be effected at all. Improvements are 
easier to introduce - and might then lead to convergence - if this can be done step by step, or when 
the improvement is limited and well defined in terms of what it entails, or when there are examples of 
successful innovators, and when a strong case can be made for the change under consideration. 
None of these conditions is fulfilled in the case of a corporate governance system. Let us discuss 
these conditions one after the other.  
1. Proceeding step by step is the same as changing a given system by altering one element at a time 
in order to arrive at the (presumed) better system. By definition, complementarity implies that 
partial changes with respect to individual elements do not result in an improvement if the starting 
situation is a local optimum. In practice this could mean that a given new legal device or a non-
standard corporate governance practice is not accepted by the relevant legal and business 
communities. The innovation might be discontinued or abolished again or simply fall into oblivion. 
Changes must therefore relate to at least a "critical mass" of elements of a corporate governance 
system, and this is more difficult to implement. 
2. The type of corporate governance that an individual  corporation in a given country can use 
successfully strongly depends on the corporate governance system which prevails in that country. 
This has two reasons. One is that lenders, clients, potential and current employees and others will 
prefer to deal with a company which does not differ in a fundamental way from other companies 
with which they are acquainted, and courts tend to apply the rules and interpretations to which 
they are accustomed. Frustrating these entrenched expectations of others would create important 
                                                                                                                                                                                                           
to practically useful advice insofar as it helps to identify consistency as a decisive factor in determining the 
success of policy measures.    20
legal and commercial risks for an innovator in the field of corporate governance. Thus, there is 
complementarity between the governance systems of the different corporations within a country.  
In most of Europe there is a second reason why it is, or at least was until very recent ruling of the 
European Supreme Court,
45almost impossible for an individual corporation to opt for a different 
corporate governance system which might appear more attractive. In contrast to the American 
situation,
46 European business corporations cannot, or perhaps could not, choose the jurisdiction 
and with it elements of their corporate governance system by merely changing the location of 
incorporation
47. The applicable law is, by and large, the law of the place in which they do most of 
their business (the headquarter's site). Therefore at least in Europe the switching of jurisdictions 
by corporations does not constitute a mechanism which could lead to a convergence towards the 
(presumed) best corporate governance system.  
3. Even though corporate governance systems can easily be defined at the theoretical level, in 
practice it is anything but clear where the limits of a corporate governance system must be drawn 
and which other elements of an economic and legal system would have to change together with 
the core elements of a corporate governance system if the goal were to make fundamental 
alterations to the existing governance system. There is complementarity between the different 
elements of an economic, social and legal system in which governance is embedded. A certain 
system of corporate governance is not a module which can simply be plugged into any economy 
                                                                                                                                                                                                           
44 See the references in Bebchuk & Roe, supra n. 1, pp. 2,.and the sources in supra n. 4. See also Viktor 
Vanberg/Wolfgang  Kerber, Institutional Competition Among Jurisdictions, An Evolutionary Approach, 5 
Constitutional Political Economy 193 (1994) for a discussion of the mechanisms of convergence. 
45 EuGH 9.3.1999 Rs. C -212/97 Hojesteret / Centros, 20 Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht (ZIP) 1999, 438. The 
decision is discussed, among others, by Herbert Roth, Gründungstheorie: Ist der Damm gebrochen? (Is the 
doctrine of registration [JEFF: GERALD DID NOT KNOW A GOOD TRANSLATION OF THE LEGAL TERM 
"GRÜNDUNGSTHEORIE, i e THE DOCTRINE THAT A CORPORATION CAN FREELY CHOOSE WHERE IT 
WATS TO BE REGISTERED; E G IN DELAWARE) already accepted?), ZIP 1999, 861; Otto Sandrock, Centros: Ein 
Etappensieg für die Überlagerungstheorie (An interim victory for the doctrine of registration [JEFF, PLEASE 
INSERT THE TERM WHICH YOU MAY HAVE FOUND FOR "GRÜNDUNGSTHEORIE"], Betriebsberater 1999, 
1337; and Werner Ebke, Das Schicksal der Sitztheorie nach dem Centros-Urteil des EuGH, (The fate of the doctrine 
of location), Juristenzeitung 1999, 656. 
46 Cf. William J. Carney, The Political Economy of Competition for Corporate Charters, 26 J. Leg. Stud. 303, 315 et 
seq. (1997); David Charny, Competition among Jurisdictions in Formulating Corporate Law Rules, 32 Harv. Int. L. 
J. 423, 428 (1991); brief summary in Romano, supra n. 11, p. 132. 
47 For Germany, see the ruling of the Supreme Court: Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofes in Zivilsachen 
(BGHZ) 97, 269 (271) (F.R.G.); Bernhard Grossfeld, in: Staudinger, Internationales Gesellschaftsrecht (International 
Law of Coporations) (13
th ed., Berlin: de Gruyter 1998), Rn. 22ff., 33ff.; Carsten Thomas Ebenroth, in: Münchener 
Kommentar (2nd ed., München: C.H. Beck 1990), following Art. 10 EGBGB Rn. 139 et seq., 177 et seq.; Daniel 
Zimmer, Internationales Gesellschaftsrecht 213 (Heidelberg: Verlag Recht und Wirtschaft 1996).   21
and society. Therefore, it is very difficult to imagine that a sweeping, overall replacement of one 
corporate governance system by another could happen in reality.
48 
4. The viability of a given  national corporate governance system may depend on whether this 
system is (relatively) isolated from others. The following situation is conceivable and in our view 
also likely: One system, say S1, would be viable and unambiguously better than other systems if 
there were only one system which everybody had to live with, while if more than one system 
coexisted at least for a certain time, S 1 would not be viable any more. It is so far not clear 
whether the prototypical corporate governance systems described briefly above, and in particular 
the insider control system, are immune to this effect of "interpenetration", which globalization has 
already created.
49 Therefore, if there should be convergence at all, it might be a convergence 
towards a corporate governance system which is not the "overall optimum" or, in economic terms, 
towards an inefficient equilibrium, even if the standards for assessing corporate governance 
systems were considered as a given. 
5. Last but not least, and in part as a consequence of the other factors mentioned above, there is 
certainly not a general consensus as to what would be the best corporate governance system, let 
lone one which everybody would want to see universally adopted. The difficulty of determining 
the best corporate governance system is, again, due to the complementarity of the elements: 
Because of this feature, it would not be sufficient to "add up" the qualities of the elements of 
conceivable systems, whose individual assessment would in itself be a formidable task for any 
decision maker. 
                                                                 
48 In this context it is important to understand how closely German corporate law, and thus also the legal basis of 
many elements of German corporate governance, is connected with tax law. Both the tax-paying corporations and 
the tax-collecting authorities would start a militant campaign against any change which endangered their financial 
interests. The specifically German concept of groups of companies and the way they are treated by law 
("Konzernrecht") are essentially an outgrowth of tax considerations, for a brief outline cf. Spindler, supra n. 7, p. 
7. At the same time it is one of the foundations of the distribution of power between the two boards in German 
corporations. The "Konzernrecht" gives so much power to the management that this requires a strong 
supervisory board as a counterweight. Given the tax-induced interests, it is almost inconceivable that focussed 
corporate governance reform efforts would be able to alter essential structures. One interesting example is the 
ongoing debate on the relationship between principles of accounting and principles of corporate taxation: As the 
present German system of taxation is based on the profit determined by the system of financial accounting, the tax 
burden of German corporations would rise considerably if the current trend to adopt US-GAAP for reporting 
purposes were to be extended to accounting for tax purposes. This would lead to much higher levels of profits 
and thus possibly also taxation, because it would imply the demise of some old German accounting principles like 
“Niederstwertprinzip” (principle of valuing assets at the lower of cost or market). 
49 As we will argue below, there are indeed reasons to expect that the overlapping of systems poses a greater 
threat to the viability of an insider control system than to that of an outsider control system.   22
These five arguments suggest a dilemma: It does not appear to be likely that individual innovators and 
national politicians could bring about a change of corporate governance systems which would 
ultimately lead to a convergence to the best system. Any substantive change would have to be a very 
comprehensive one. Thus supranational "governments" might have a role to play here. However, 
there is simply no supranational political authority or other entity which would have the knowledge 
and the power to impose, in several countries at the same time, what it might consider to be the 
universally best corporate governance system.
50 This leads us to the negative result that a simplistic 
story of the competition and convergence of corporate governance systems cannot be valid. 
4. A different scenario: convergence towards an inefficient system 
The arguments presented above are not meant to suggest that actions of individual innovators, 
national politicians and even supranational entities and the "interpenetration" of different corporate 
governance systems have no effect on the corporate governance systems in the various countries. 
And even though there is probably neither a consensus nor incontrovertible evidence on what 
constitutes the best corporate governance system, not all conceivable systems are equally good, and 
almost everybody is at least to a certain extent interested in not having a corporate governance 
system for his firm or country, which is simply too bad. In fact, we believe that these very factors 
work together in what we consider to be an alternative scenario for the development of corporate 
governance systems - a scenario which can also lead to "inefficient convergence", and which might 
even be a realistic scenario for the development in the unifying Europe.  
In order to present our alternative account, we need to recall the above presentation of the (Anglo-
Saxon) system of outsider control and the (German-Japanese) system of insider control. Let us 
assume that these two are the only systems which countries could adopt. It is not obvious that one of 
them is superior in terms of its economic efficiency under normal and stable circumstances; and we 
certainly do not claim to know this either. But for the sake of making our point, let us assume that 
the (German-Japanese) insider control system is superior. 
                                                                 
50 This statement may turn out to be wrong in the near future, as major stock exchanges are currently involved in 
the formation of a "world-wide cartel" or at least a narrow oligopoly. By formulating listing requirements which 
pertain to aspects of corporate governance, such as the existence of independent audit and compensation 
committees composed of outside board members, the "cartel of stock exchanges" might come close to acting like 
a "world government", and it might be a knowledgeable one at that, cf. Spindler, Deregulierung des Aktienrechts? 
(Deregulation in corporate law?), 43 Die Aktiengesellschaft 53, 67 (1998). However, even if this were to happen 
soon, there would still be the question whether this would merely constitute rule convergence or also systems 
convergence in the sense of the distinction introduced by Bebchuk & Roe.   23
The two systems function according to different principles. More specifically, they make use of 
implicit contracts, mutually consistent expectations, etc., to a different extent. The outsider control 
system is parsimonious in this respect. Its functioning hardly depends on agents anticipating correctly 
what other agents will do and what they will in turn expect other agents to do and to expect. A 
functioning outsider control system could be modeled as an equilibrium in a relatively simple game.  
The i nsider control model is fundamentally different. It requires much more in terms of mutually 
consistent expectations. The proper functioning of this system involves a great number of people with 
different roles - managers, bankers, labor representatives and (other) board members - and different 
backgrounds. For a corporate governance system like the German one to benefit both the firms and 
the public, all kinds of explicit and implicit deals among several stakeholder groups have to be made. 
In order to do this, the different parties need to learn what to expect from each other and to trust 
each other, and to carefully balance co-operation and confrontation; and this learning process in turn 
requires time and stability. The greater the number of people who are actively involved in a system, 
the harder it is to stabilize the system; and, due to the high costs of building up and maintaining the 
degree of mutual trust which is required for implicit contracts, the more markets tend to be global, 
the more difficult it is to keep an insider controlled system functioning   
This has implications for the convergence issue. Today we are in a situation of global competition and 
regulatory changes of all kinds and other corporate governance-related innovations coming from 
various sources. These developments are having destabilizing effects on both systems. But these 
effects are not equally important in both systems. Because of its greater reliance on mutually 
consistent and stable expectations, trust and implicit contracts, the German system is probably 
affected to a greater degree, and is also probably being destabilized to a greater extent.
51  
Now assume that the process of destabilizing existing national corporate governance systems goes 
on for some time and even intensifies universally, i.e. both in countries that use the insider control 
system and in countries that use the outsider control system. At some point there might even be a 
general corporate governance crisis. By a "crisis" we mean a situation in which essentially all or most 
governance mechanisms fail to function. For example, attempts to introduce hostile takeovers into an 
insider control system could lead to so much controversy within supervisory boards that they cease 
to be able to monitor the management; or real shareholder activism in accordance with the German   24
model could, in the outsider control system, create wide-spread suspicion that there are strong 
informational asymmetries, which would reduce the liquidity of the stock market, reduce its 
informational efficiency and undermine the functioning of the market for corporate control.  
As such a "crisis" would reduce overall economic efficiency, there would be a strong pressure from 
many sides to restore some kind of order immediately and at least on a national level. In such a 
case, firms and national authorities in all affected countries would have to settle for some "workable" 
national corporate governance system as any consistent system is better than an inconsistent system 
or, to use the colloquial notion of a "system", better than no system at all. Assume that the changes 
which have been brought into the systems have gone so far that the "natural" tendency to go back to 
the former system is not strong any more because it would also be difficult to restore the old 
equilibrium situation. Thus despite the crisis, and even more so in the case of a crisis, the fundamental 
choices continue to be the outsider and the insider control systems.
52 It is impossible to make precise 
statements about what the process which would eventually lead to a workable system could look 
like. But under the circumstances which we assume here, the idea of a deliberate process of making 
a well-informed choice of the most efficient corporate governance system does not appear 
appropriate. Instead, this process is likely to be a rather chaotic one, and it would in all likelihood be 
myopic. That is, it would probably rather have the attributes of the processes assumed in 
evolutionary biology than those in standard economic theory.  
However, what is even more important is this: In a crisis, i.e. a situation in which there are reasons 
and public pressure to do "something", and to do it fast, the criteria for determining the "winner" in 
the ensuing competition between corporate governance systems will be different from those which, 
hopefully, apply under normal circumstances. The system for which firms and authorities in their 
respective roles would probably settle in all countries would most likely not be the one with the most 
desirable economic consequences under normal and stable conditions, but rather the one with the 
most attractive features in the crisis situation.
53 In such a situation stable expectations are no longer 
                                                                                                                                                                                                           
51 For instance, the attempt by Krupp to stage a hostile takeover of Thyssen in 1997 has made it seem possible 
that Anglo-Saxon-style hostile takeovers might upset all implicit contracts like those which help define the role of 
representatives of large banks on the supervisory boards of German corporations. 
52 As explained above, middle-of-the-road systems would not qualify as contenders because they lack 
consistency and are thus also not likely to be economically viable. This is also true in a crisis situation. 
53  "What persists is what is best adapted to persist during the crisis" (Roe, supra n. 2, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 641, 663 
(1996). That the quality of being crisis-proof is simply different from efficiency under stable conditions can be 
directly inferred from a standard example in evolutionary biology. Bacteria with very simple structures are 
probably the species most likely to survive all crises, however great external shocks might be. Nevertheless, 
bacteria would probably not qualify as the culmination of evolution.   25
justified, trust is not appropriate, and implicit contracts are not likely to be honored. Therefore, the 
best system would be one which relies least on these elements. Among the two prototypes of 
corporate governance systems, some variant of the outsider system would be the best choice in this 
situation. In particular, it would be very difficult to even imagine a return to the old German system 
after expectations have been frustrated at a large scale, trust has been undermined and implicit 
contracts have been broken.  
We thus come to the conclusion that in what would amount to a competition under crisis conditions 
between the two systems, which would have both been shaken up and destabilized by external 
factors, the winner would probably be the Anglo-Saxon system - not because it is better under 
normal and stable conditions, but because it is simpler to achieve and to maintain: The more wide-
spread the crisis is, the more likely a convergence to the more "crisis-resistant" consistent system 
would be. Even if external factors only destabilized the insider control systems, the outcome might be 
similar. Globalization leading to an "interpenetration" of corporate governance systems which had 
formerly been largely isolated from each other is probably a factor which challenges the insider 
systems more than the outsider systems. Nothing said so far rules out the possibility that the outsider 
system could be the inferior system in a comparison in which one of the two systems would be the 
only one applied on a universal scale, that is, as our assumption of the superiority of the German-
Japanese system can indeed be true, there is the possibility of a convergence towards an inefficient 
equilibrium.  
V. Outlook 
The scenario of a convergence to an inefficient or inferior equilibrium may be a real possibility. As we 
have already noted, we feel that there are currently strong tendencies in the real world, and notably in 
Europe, which tend to undermine the existing corporate governance systems and might lead to a 
general adoption of some variant of the Anglo-Saxon system although it is in principle possible that 
the German-Japanese system is the better system as long as it were the only system and as long as 
only one system of corporate governance were applied universally. The most recent event is the 
successful hostile takeover bid by Vodafone for Mannesmann. Note that we do not want to make 
any claim that some variant of the German-Japanese system is indeed the better system; the recent 
political turmoil in Germany
54 and the prolonged economic crisis in Japan cast some serious doubts 
                                                                 
54 We are here referring to the CDU slash-fund affair of late 1999 and early 2000, in which the former German 
chancellor, an admitted and fervent advocate and active protector of the old German system, plays a key role.    26
on the actual truth of any such claim. But given the importance of corporate governance and of the 
possible convergence, we feel that the issues raised in the preceding discussion, and in particular the 
question of which system would emerge as the "winner" in a crisis, is more than an intellectual 
exercise. Of course, the scenario with a general crisis in different corporate governance systems, or 
at least in the insider control system, constitutes an extreme case. Having presented a rather strong 
proposition, we need to add some caveats.  
First of all, a scenario should not be mistaken for a prediction. We do not want to predict a 
corporate governance crisis of the kind described above as the inevitable consequence of any 
attempt to introduce what is considered to be an improvement if this measure does not fit into the 
framework of the insider and outsider control system, respectively. After all, consistency of a 
corporate governance system is not an objective fact which any reasonable person should be able to 
see. It is a construct which exists in the minds of a few academics. There is a danger that these 
observers will misinterpret what constitutes the respective system, or that they will overestimate the 
importance of complementarity and coherence and underestimate the potential for partial reforms 
which disregard these aspects.  
This raises the question of how stable the systems are with respect to "inconsistent improvements" 
and, thus, what scope there is for partial changes. Some examples of "inconsistent improvements" 
have already been mentioned before.
55 It remains to be seen how the established systems manage to 
adapt to these developments.   
Secondly, our juxtaposition of just the two well-known consistent systems, the outsider and insider 
control systems, seems to suggest that there cannot be other consistent systems. We do not want to 
make such a claim. But if there are indeed other possible systems of corporate governance, which 
have only not yet been discovered and tested, and if these are not merely inconsistent mixtures of the 
elements of the two standard systems, then to warn against any experiments in the field of corporate 
governance might be to overstate the case for consistency. Such experiments might in fact generate 
new and possibly also consistent systems which could even lead the way to convergence.  
Thirdly, and closely related to the second caveat, our analysis may have created the impression that 
corporate governance systems need to be rather rigid in terms of their consistency if they are to be 
viable; and this seems to suggest that there is not much scope for flexibility. However, a look at 
                                                                 
55 Cf. supra n. 41.   27
reality shows that there are currently strong tendencies to increase flexibility. One example is the 
relaxation of the traditional strict mandatory structure of German stock corporation law. After the 
German Supreme Court has allowed the formation of a mixed form of a partnership in which one 
partner is a stock corporation listed at the stock exchange, and the other a corporation with limited 
liability without access to the stock exchange (GmbH), corporate law practice now feels free to 
"contract around" many clauses that had been mandatory for stock corporations,
56 including those 
which pertain to main elements of their corporate governance. Another example is the ongoing 
discussion about the European Stock Corporation and its governance, which is intended to be very 
flexible. This flexibility will probably be used, to circumvent mandatory codetermination.
57 On the 
other hand, there are now cases in which codetermination rights, which closely resemble those 
imposed by law in Germany, have been established on a contractual basis. We do not know what 
these developments entail for the viability of corporate governance systems and possibly also for 
convergence. Further research is clearly needed. 
 
 
                                                                 
56 Cf. BGHZ (Supreme Court) 134, 392 (F.R.G.); Hans-Christoph Ihrig/Michael Schlitt, Die GmbH & Co KGaA nach 
dem Beschluß BGHZ 134, 392, p. 33 (Peter Ulmer ed., Heidelberg: Verlag Recht und Wirtschaft  
1998). 
57 Cf. Peter Hanau, Neuer Anlauf zur mitbestimmten SE (A new start to reach a "societas europaea" with 
codetermination), 51 Recht der Arbeit 231 (1998) and the new British draft on the regulation of codetermination, 51 
Recht der Arbeit 239 (1998). 